Dr. Garret Martin
Hurst Senior Professorial Lecturer at American University’s School of International Service, and Co-Director of the Transatlantic Policy Center. He has written widely on transatlantic relations and Europe, both in the field of history and contemporary affairs, and focuses in particular on security, US foreign policy, NATO, European politics. He is a frequent media commentator for US and international outlets.
Twitter: @AU_EuropeCenter
Email: garretm@american.edu
U.S. Election 2024
12. The campaigns’ pandemic memory hole (Prof Michael Serazio)
13. America’s kingdom of contempt (Prof Barry Richards)
14. Americanism, not globalism 2.0: Donald Trump and America’s role in the world (Prof Jason A. Edwards)
15. The politics of uncertainty: Mediated campaign narratives about Russia’s war on Ukraine (Dr Tetyana Lokot)
16. The U.S. elections and the future of European security: Continuity or disruption? (Dr Garret Martin)
17. Trump’s victory brings us closer to the new world disorder (Prof Roman Gerodimos)
18. Abortion: Less important to voters than anticipated (Dr Zoë Brigley Thompson)
19. Roe your vote? (Dr Lindsey Meeks)
20. Gender panics, far-right radicalization, and the effectiveness of anti-trans political ads (Dr Thomas J. Billard)
21. U.S. politics and planetary crisis in 2024 (Dr Reed Kurtz)
22. Trump and Musk for all mankind (Prof Einar Thorsen)
23. Guns and the 2024 election (Prof Robert J. Spitzer)
24. Echoes of Trump: Potential shifts in Congress’s communication culture (Dr Annelise Russell)
The presidential election looked for several months like it could be an outlier. Typically, U.S. voters tend to be motivated by domestic matters, but it seemed that it could be different this time. In a September 2024 poll, foreign policy actually ranked quite high in voters’ concerns. More Democrats and Republicans combined suggested international affairs were “very important” to their vote than, say, immigration and abortion. Yet, that poll proved to be a mirage. Exit polls confirmed voters were disproportionately driven by the economy and the state of democracy, with foreign policy far behind.
That said, even if not the forefront concern, the election will still likely prove very consequential for U.S. foreign policy, and especially for some specific issues and regions. Voters were not offered an obvious choice toward China, since both candidates promised to maintain a policy of competition. On Europe and the Atlantic Alliance, however, Donald Trump and Kamala Harris promised very sharp and clear distinctions. As Jim Goldgeier and Elizabeth Saunders pointed out, NATO was on the ballot in November.
President-elect Donald Trump has a long history of deriding NATO, dating back decades. During the 2016 campaign, he routinely called the Alliance ‘obsolete,’ complaining about burden sharing among allies. He even threatened to withhold Article V protection – the core collective security provision – for allies not meeting spending levels. During his first term in office, Trump stuck to the same tune, routinely insulting allies at high-level summits, and he allegedly came close to withdrawing from the Alliance altogether in 2018. While NATO made inroads in bolstering its Eastern flank in that period, Trump’s time in office was primarily defined by internal turmoil and limited cohesion within the Alliance.
After leaving office in early 2021, Trump’s attitude toward NATO hardly mellowed. On the campaign trail in 2024, he continued to attack allies, and caused a stir when adding that Russia could “do whatever the hell they want” to member states not spending enough on defense. Furthermore, he also hinted that he would not support Ukraine and that he could achieve peace between Kyiv and Moscow in 24 hours, without explaining how he might achieve that feat.
Unlike her political rival, Vice President Kamala Harris promised predictability and continuity as far as U.S. policy toward NATO and European security. She did not signal any intent to deviate from the approach taken by the Biden administration for the past four years.
Joe Biden, in his 2021 inaugural address, had committed to repair alliances, after the turbulent Trump years, and sought to avoid the public attacks against rivals. The transatlantic partnership was certainly not free from hiccups and disputes in recent years, such as over the AUKUS deal or the 2021 chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan; but Biden did invest heavily to keep NATO united in its response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Harris’ rhetoric in the past year only reaffirmed this strong attachment to the Atlantic Alliance. During the 2024 Munich Security Conference, in February, she stated that “our sacred commitment to NATO remains ironclad” and that “NATO is the greatest military alliance the world has ever known.” Harris also firmly emphasized her continued support for Ukraine, attending its peace summit in June 2024, and meeting President Zelensky multiple times.
In other words, voters would not have expected a great shift toward NATO during a Kamala Harris administration, which would continue to view the alliance as fundamental to U.S. foreign policy. There would have been broad continuity, with the possibility of small shifts on specific issues. For instance, a Harris presidency might have paved the way for Ukraine to join NATO or allowed authorities in Kyiv to strike at deep targets in Russia.
So, what should we expect from the 47th President? Donald Trump is notoriously difficult to predict and tends to blow hot and cold. We can safely assume that transatlantic relations will generally experience another very turbulent period. He has never been shy in his criticism of Europe, calling the European Union a “foe” in 2018, and more recently lambasting it as a “mini-China.” And his plan to impose tariffs on European partners will ensure friction between allies on both sides of the Atlantic.